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1  INTRODUCTION
In  agrarian  societies  land  is not  only the  main  means for  generating  a  livelihood  but often  also  to
accumulate  wealth  and  transfer  it  between  generations. The  way  in which  land  rights  are  assigned
therefore  determines households'  ability to produce their subsistence and generate marketable  surplus,
their social and economic status (and in many cases their collective identity),  their incentive to exert non-
observable effort and  make  investments, and  often also their ability to access financial markets  or to
arrange for smoothing of consumption and income.
Given this context, markets  in which to exchange rights to land can provide a low-cost means to effect
transactions  that  would  bring  this  factor  of  production  to  its  most  productive  use.  The  institutions
governing the functioning of land markets will affect the transaction cost associated with such exchanges,
the magnitude and distribution of the benefits generated by them, and the incentives for rational economic
agents to undertake efficiency-enhancing transfers  and land-improving investments. Furthermore,  since
land  is one  of the  best  collateral  assets  available,  clearer  property  rights and  greater  ease  of their
exchange are likely to affect the emergence and efficiency of financial markets. This implies that land
markets have an essential role in the broader process of economic development.
In this paper we first examine the way in which property rights in land evolve in an ideal and undistorted
environment. We view the emergence of land rights as an endogenous response to increased scarcity of
land and the  associated  incentives for  land-related investment and  then  discuss  other factors  such as
further  increases  in  population  density,  better  access  to  markets,  or  the  introduction  of  improved
technology to exploit the  land, that would  lead to increased productivity of agricultural cultivation,  as
well as  endogenous technical change. We note that, historically, there have been few cases where such
an uninterrupted evolution  has been followed and briefly sketch the conditions required as well  as the
deviations from this ideal path. With this in mind, we discuss factors affecting the costs and benefits from
individualized  land  rights  and  examine  empirical  evidence  for  their  magnitude.  In  particular,  the
implications of tenure security for investment incentives are highlighted.
Having clarified the concept of property rights in land, we turn to land sales and rental markets. To do so,
we consider the main factors affecting participation in those markets, in particular characteristics  of theagricultural  production  process,  labor  supervision  cost,  credit  access,  the  risk  characteristics  of  an
individuals'  asset portfolio, and the transaction costs associated with market participation. These factors
will affect land sales and rental markets differently; in particular, even if owner-operated farms are more
productive than wage-labor operated ones, the sales market will not necessarily shift land to them.  This
implies that, in environments where financial markets are imperfect, land market operation needs to be
considered within  a  broader  perspective focusing  on  access to  other  markets  and  the  availability  of
alternative assets.  We note that, in general, land rental markets would be less affected by these problems
because renting out does not preclude  the landlord from utilizing  land as a collateral  to  access credit
which  could then  be passed  on  to the  tenant  in an  interlinked  contract. Removing  obstacles -often
government regulations or imperfections in other markets-  that prevent smooth functioning of land rental
markets  and taking  measures  that enhance  potential tenants'  endowments and  bargaining  power, can
considerably increase both the welfare of the poor and overall efficiency of resource allocation.  There
are also many instances where sales markets are regulated in a manner which  hamnpers  incentives for
socially optimal  behavior. In addition to reducing tenure insecurity, governments can in these situations
improve the efficiency of resources use by avoiding interventions limiting rental and sales market.
Finally,  in a number of countries, a highly unequal  land ownership distribution  implies inefficient and
inequitable resource use which the land sales or rental markets are not able to smoothly transform into a
more efficient and equitable allocation.  Based on these issues we draw policy conclusions concerning the
transition from communal to individualized land rights and the award of titles, steps that might be used to
improve the functioning of land sales and rental markets, and the scope for redistributive land reform.
2  PROPERTY RIGHT TO LAND
2.1  THE  EMERGENCE  OF  LAND  RIGHTS
The process  of  gradual  individualization  of property rights  in  land can  be conceived  as an  induced
institutional response to higher shadow prices of land to encourage longer term investments in land, as in
the pioneering analysis by Boserup. I At the earliest stages of development, even before the establishment
of sedentary agriculture, tribes of hunters and gatherers assert control over certain locations wlhere  they
collect  food and  engage in hunting. As population density increases, forest  fallow  systems,  and  then
communal property right systems emerge. Under these arrangements, the general right to cultivation of a
It is well understood  that this idealized  process  has  rarely  been followed  in actual  history  (Boserup  herself  devotes  more than one chapter  to the
issue  of coercion  and the description  of feudal  systems).  It is, nonetheless,  useful  to illustrate  the main  underlying  factors.
2piece of land is an inseparable and in principle inalienable element of tribal membership. GCltivation  rights
are assigned to individuals on a temporary basis, normally as long as the cleared plot is cultivated. Once
cultivation has ended (due to exhaustion of soil fertility), the plot falls back to the community and the family
either selects a new plot (if land is abundant) or has a plot allocated by the chief of the tribe.The fact that
land is held by the community rather than the individual facilitates periodic redistribution of at least part
of the land among community members based on population growth, serving as a social safety net and
preventing the  emergence of a class of permanently  landless individuals. Tenure security  in a general
sense is very high, i.e. individual members enjoy secure and inheritable general rights to cultivable land
which can be reactivated even after a period of absence.
As the relative scarcity of land increases, the pledging or intra-community rental of land emerges. This
practice, whereby land that is not used can temporarily be pledged to another family, with the stipulation that
it has to be returned upon request, facilitates the productive use of land in case the original owner is unable
to undertake cultivation. It  is distinctly different from permanent land transactions and  is generally not
allowed to  involve people from outside the community?  It also does not uniformly apply to all  land -
unimproved land lying fallow at any given time continues to be at the free disposal of the community for
example for grazing by domestic animals owned by any family with cultivation rights. Variations of such
communal tenure  systems where  parcels are re-allocated from time  to time  in order to  accommodate
population growth and grazing land is left for communal use are common in many parts of the developing
world such as China, large parts of Africa, and Mexico.
What are the factors driving this process of successively increasing precision in the definition of property
rights to land?  The most frequent explanation is that a virtuous cycle of technical change and investment
is set  in  motion by  a  combination  of  increasing population  density, technical  progress,  commercial
integration, and reduction  of risk. Boserup was the first to point  out the  fact that,  historically, higher
population  density  was  the  driving  force  behind  an  endogenous  process  of  better  definition  and
enforcement  of property rights, changing arrangements for the organization  of production, and  higher
levels of investment.
The Boserupian framework of changes in the relative scarcity and of land use of labor-saving technology
can, for example,  explain systematic changes in the strength of womens'  land rights (Platteau  1998b).
Under  land  abundance  and  predominance  of  shifting  cultivation,  agriculture  tends  to  be  female-
2 Indeed, the distinguishing characteristic of communal tenure systems is not a lack of general tenure security but the fact that property rights are
not pernanently  linked to a specific plot, implying the existence of restrictions on the transferability of land rights (especially to individuals who
are not members of the community).
3dominated, polygyny  is widespread,  and women enjoy high status as workers as well  as childbearers.
Marriage is accompanied by the transfer of bridewealth to the bride's family and, in case of the husband's
death, women retain  land rights either in their native or in their new village. With greater increased land
scarcity and adoption of the plough the importance of women in agricultural production tends to decline
and  bridewealth, as well  as customary safeguards to  protect widowed  and isolated women  disappear.
Instead, upon marriage the women receives a pre-mortem inheritance in the form of dowry which -as  it
remains the property of the wife- establishes a threat  point in intra-household  bargaining and  provides
economic security in the case of divorce or death of their husband.
The diffusion  of exogenous technical  change and/or expansion of trade  generally have  an investment-
increasing effect similar to the one caused by increased population density. By increasing the stream of
incomes that can be derived from a uniit of land, they augment incentives for better definition of property
rights in land. Indeed, establishment of tree crops, and the associated heavy investment in clearing and
leveling of land, was  generally only  undertaken  where  institutional  innovations had  enhanced  tenure
security  adequately  so  that  individuals  could  be  sure  to  reap  the  benefits  from  such  investments.
Similarly, the transport revolution caused by the steamship in the late  19th century  led not only to the
incorporation of hitherto unexplored countries and states into global trade but also increased the demand
for  individualized ownership of land.  For example the opening of Thailand to international  rice trade
through the Bowering treaty  of  1826 induced a quantum increase  in the  demand  for rice  land  in the
Thailand plains, and brought about the introduction of a formal land registration system (Feeny, 1982),
induced a quantum increase  in the demand for rice  land in the Thailand plains,  and brought about the
introduction of a formal land registration system.
Another important factor furthering the evolution of individual property rights to land is the reduction of
risk to income and consumption. The three major avenues for this to come about are (i) the development
of markets for output, capital, and insurance; (ii) technical progress that allows diversification, reduction
of the covariance of yields,  and the probability of crop failure, and (iii) the emergence of access to non-
covariate  streams of off-farm  income. It has  long been noted that  group  ownership  of land  (or joint
communal production) can be viewed as an "insurance policy" to eliminate the threat of permanent assets
loss or  to  reduce  vulnerability  to  idiosyncratic  consumption  shocks.  However,  the  scope  for  using
communal land ownership to insure against non-idiosyncratic shocks is limited by the weather-induced
covariance of  agricultural  production.  Especially  when  it entails  collective  production,3 the  costs  of
l Group ownership has often been  prevalent where risk is  high and where factors  such as remoteness,  environmental  hazard,  or presence of
external enemies, imply that superior insurance mechanism are not available (Ellickson 1993).
4collective production are high and  individuals to prefer individual ownership once  alternative and less
costly mechanisms to insure against covariate risks become available (see Key et al. 1998 for the case of
Mexican ejidos).4
It is well known that, because monitoring of effort in agricultural production is very difficult and costly,
collectives  where  individuals  are  not  residual  claimants  to  profits  are  highly  inefficient  forms  of
agricultural production (Deininger, 1993). However, contrary to widespread misconceptions, communal
tenure  systems are generally not based on  collective production. Instead production on  arable  plots is
normally  undertaken by  individuals who are residual claimants to output implying that, on arable plots,
incentives  for  effort supply  by individual  cultivators  are  likely to  be appropriate.  Inefficiencies  may
persist with regard to either the longer-term sustainability of decisions concerning the use of communal
areas  such  as forests  and  pasture  or the  disincentive to  invest  deriving  from  the  inability  to  claim
ownership rights to specific plots. In an analysis of Mexican farming communities (ejidos), McCarthy et
al. (1  997) provide empirical evidence for the existence of collective action problems regarding the use of
pasture and forest, but not of individually managed plots.
Communal resource ownership is often motivated by the ability to provide benefits in the form of easier
provision of public goods, arrangements to enhance equity, or the ability to take advantage of synergies
that would be difficult to realize under fully individualized ownership. Examples include risk-reduction
through  diversification  advantages  in  highly variable  environments  (Nugent  and  Sanchez  1994), the
utilization of economies  of scale  to break  seasonal labor bottlenecks (Beard  1996; Mearns  1996), or
investment in community-level infrastructure (Boserup 1965; Dong 1996).5 As long as effective means
of governance and accountable institutions at the local level are available, these systems can -especially
in situations when there  is need for community-level investment- be very effective. For example,  under
the  medieval open field system, cultivation decisions were made collectively  but monitoring-sensitive
tasks  were carried  out on  an  individual basis.  This allowed  utilizing  economies  of scale  in  fencing,
harvesting,  shepherding,  and  risk  diversification  through  strip-cropping  without  compromising  the
advantages of individual effort supply (McCloskey 1975 and 1991;Townsend 1993; Blarel et al. 1992).
The usufructuary rights given under  communal tenure systems  do not impose  large  losses as  long as
population density is low and land is relatively abundant, pay off for making  long-term investments is
4  The potential usefulness of communal land ownership as a device for consumption- smoothing is inversely related to the incidence of locally
covariate climatic shocks. It is thus not surprising that, at comparable levels of population density, communal tenure systems have proven to be
more durable in environments where such risks are lower.
SAn interesting case to illustrate this is made by Ellickson (1993) who compares different settlements (Jamestown, Plymouth, Salt lake City, and
the Bennudas)  to suggest that, while many frontier settlements started out with  group ownership and production to utilize economies of scale in
5low, and definition of individual property rights in land is costly. However, even though individuals have
the  right  to  cultivate  specific  plots  (a  measure  that  avoids  the  efficiency  losses  due  to  collective
production), the  lack of permanent rights that  is implied by the periodic  re-distribution  of plots  may
decrease incentives to make long term land-related investments under communal arrangements. A similar
effect comes thorough the limitation of land transfers to members of the community and the inability to
utilize land as a collateral for credit.
Improved access to markets, infrastructure, and financial intermediation, are alternative ways to provide
the benefits -in  terms of insurance, diversification, and access to funds for investment- associated with
communal forms of  land ownership. At the  same time these exogenous  factors  increase the costs -in
terms of investment disincentives and foregone land transactions with outsiders- associated with traditional
land  ownership systems.  This  implies that, with  economic development, the  relative  attractiveness  of
communal systems will decrease and, at some point, it would be economically rational for a community to
allocate permanent and fully tradable ownership rights to individuals (seeThompson  and Wilson  1993 for
Mexico), completing the transition from a communal to an individualized tenure system.
However,  instead of  following  an  smooth endogenous evolution  along  the  lines  outlined above,  the
transition  to  individual  property rights has  in the  large majority of  historical  cases  been  affected by
exogenous interventions. As population growth increases the relative scarcity of land, one observes a general
increase  in  boundary  conflicts  and  social  tension.6 In  the  absence  of  strong  and  representative
community-level  institutions,  this  often  leads  to  appropriation  of  property  rights  to  the  communal
resources by powerful individuals, by and abuses of power and land grabbing through  local chiefs and
headmen.7  These  phenomena  are  often  seen  as  a  major  course  of  environmental  degradation  and
increased social tension and inequality that leaves out the poor and vulnerable.
History  demonstrates  that  regions  with  potential  for  agricultural  or  non-agricultural  exports  were
generally characterized by the appropriation of large tracts of lands through imperialist, colonial, or other
overlords who either replaced local chiefs and elders, or tried to co-opt them to enforce their rule. These
changes undermined traditional tenure systems, the associated structures of accountability, and thus the
institutional underpinning of the organic evolution of such systems (Downs and Reyna, 1993; Feder and
defense and other activities, the length of maintaining group ownership can be related to the riskiness of the environment, the frequency of social
interaction and the hierarchy structure of decision-making.
6 Zimmerman and Carter (1996) show that incorporating agent heterogeneity, risk, and subsistence constraints can facilitate a more differentiated
assessment of the welfare- and productivity-impact of a given institutional innovation (e.g. the adoption of marketable land rights) on different
groups of producers.
7 For example, despite extremely  low levels of population density in Zambia, almost 50% of small producers feel that their security of tenure is
insufficient and are willing to pay (a mean amount of US $ 40) for getting secure ownership rights  (Deininger et al. 1998). Low-cost means of
6Noronha 1987).8 Furthermore, once thiey discovered that access to  labor rather than  land was the most
limiting  factor,  overloads  generally  introduced distortions  in other  markets to  reduce the  reservation
utility of independent farmers and to assure a supply of labor for export production in mines or for the
newly established estates. In addition to reducing the reservation utility that cultivators could obtain from
independent cultivation,  such  restrictions  have  contributed to  widespread  rural  poverty  and  retarded
development  of  competitive  markets  in rural  areas, often  laying the  basis  for  continued  rural-urban
dualism.
In more recent times, Governments have, through implicit and explicit taxation, drained the rural sector
of  resources  that  could  have  fueled  a  process  of  increased  markets  integration  and  technology
development while at the same time higher rates of population growth vastly increased the need for new
technology  and  better  infrastructure  (Schiff  and  Valdes  1995). The  associated  lack  of  markets  and
technological opportunities has, in a number of cases, contributed to a situation akin to the "involution"
that had earlier been diagnosed for Asian systems (Geertz 1960), with far-reaching implications for the
structure of resource ownership rights. For example in Rwanda, with very high population density (787
persons per km2), traditional systems of land allocation have become defunct and fail to provide even the
most basic services they were designed for (Andre and Platteau .1996). As traditional limitations on land
sales have been discarded, speculative land purchases by  individuals with access to non-covariate  off-
farm  income lead to  a  rapid  dis-equalization  of landholdings.9 While  costly  land  disputes  consume
productive energy, environmental degradation continues unabated and the return to an idealized notion of
"communal  property  rights"  is unlikely to  be a  feasible option. To judge,  however,  what alternative
arrangements  would  be  feasible,  it  is  necessary  to  consider  in  more  detail  the  costs  and  benefits
associated with different tenurial arrangements.
Drawing together  the evidence on costs  and  benefits associated with  more secure and  fuller  property
rights  arrangements,  three  conclusions  emerge.  First,  where  population  density  is  sufficiently  high,
increased tenure security -not necessarily equivalent to formal title- has an important impact on increased
investment. Second, there  is some evidence that a higher degree of transfer  rights provides  additional
incentives for investments and for more efficient use of family labor. Finally, the ability to use land as
collateral  to  increase  access  to  medium  and  long term  formal  credit  markets  is  of  importance  if
increasing  tenure  security  and reducing  encroachment  from  outside  through  better  accountability  and issuance  of community-titles  could  possibly
increase  welfare  and tenure security.
' This was independent  of whether  the intervention  was associated  with  the elimination  of traditional  tenure  systems  in favor  of individualized  rights
to the selected  group,  as in many  parts of Central  and  Latin  America,  or the use  of local  chiefs and  dignitaries  as intermediaries  for the central  power
as in  African  countries.
'  It is of interest  to note that about  65% of sales  are classified  as distress  sales  -the incidence  of which  is not restricted  to the lowest landholding
group-  and an additional  17%  of lands  are sold  to cover  litigation  expenses,  often arising  from  land disputes.
7foreclosure  is  feasible.  Studies  that  compared the  financial  costs  and  economic  benefits  of  titling
program suggest that high rate of return are possible but that, unless measures to reduce the transaction
costs associated with administering credit  to smallholders are undertaken, the benefits  associated with
titles may not accrue equally to all types of farmers.
2.2  BENEFITS AND COSTS OF INDIVIDUALIZED PROPERTY RIGHTS
The main benefits from well-defined and secure individual property rights relate to (i) greater incentives
for  (and  lower  costs  of)  long-term  resource  conservation  and  the  associated  increased  demand  for
investment; (ii)  improved transferability (temporary  or permanent) of land to cultivators who have the
resources to make better use of it and (iii) the ability to use land as collateral in formal credit markets, a
benefit that is more significant where formal title exists and land transactions are actually feasible. These
benefits need to be weighed against two main types of costs: the administrative  and  logistical expense
associated  with  definition  of  boundaries,  enforcement  of  rights,  and  resolution  of  disputes  among
claimants, and the increased risk of losing a safety net provided by communal control of land.
2.2.1  Benefits from individual land rights
Improved tenure security brought about by individualized land rights will be associated with static and
dynamic benefits. Even without having full long-term security of tenure, individual cultivation rights that
entitle an individual to residual claimancy of profits generated  on a plot mark the  difference between
collective  and  private  forms  of  cultivation.  The transition  from collective  to  private  cultivation  has
historically  been associated with large  increases in productivity, as for example  in the case  of China
(McMillan et al. 1989, Lin 1992, Lin et al. 1994) However, equally important benefits from better defined
long-term property rights would come about in an inter-temporal setting where higher security of tenure
would  increase  the  incentives  for  long-term  investments,  the  incidence  of  productivity-enhancing
transfers, and the supply of credit to make such investments.  These aspects are elaborated upon below.
Tenure security
Conceptually, insecurity associated with the lack of well-defined property rights can be understood as a
random  probability of  loss of  future income due to  conflicting  challenges. Eliminating  such  a threat
through informal institutions (customary tenure) or formal institutions (land titles) will clearly  increase
the  subjective  payoff  from  productivity-enhancing  long-term  investments  and  thus  the  owner's
8willingness to undertake them. While the theoretical expectation is straightforward and easily formalized
(see for example Feder et al. 1988; Besley  1995), the critical question, and much empirical debate, has
focused on the magnitudes of such effects in a different settings.
The analysis of different types of land rights in Africa is complicated by the need to take in  account for
the potential endogeneity of investment (Besley, 1995). The reason is that there may be certain types of
investments -from  marking of boundaries to planting of trees  and  hedges, and building  of houses  or
sheds- that may be undertaken with the primary purpose of establishing  implicit property rights to land
rather than to  increase productivity  (Brasselle et  al. 1997). Depending on how such actions affect the
probability of land loss and whether or not there are community rules to provide (partial) compensation
for  such investments  when  a  plot reverts  to  the  community,  it is easy  to  construct  scenarios  where
communal  tenure  systems  may  increase  rather than  decrease  the  amount  of  land-related  investment
undertaken (Sjaastad and Bromley 1997).1O
The key result from a number of studies that have investigated the investment-enhancing effect of tenure
security is that, under formal as well as informal regimes, tenure security -as  measured by the extent of
rights possessed  by  the  owner- significantly  affects  farmers'  investment decisions.  Especially  where
investments are labor-intensive but involve few cash outlays, the unambiguous conclusion is that higher
levels of tenure security -even if they are not associated with high levels of transferability  and defined
only at an informal level- do indeed provide an important incentive for increased investment.1 I
Evidence from one of three  study areas in Ghana indicates that greater tenure security at the plot level
significantly  increases the probability that  individuals will plant trees,  and  undertake a wide  range of
other investments such as draining, irrigating, mulching, etc. (Besley  1995). The fact that field-specific
rights  but not mean  household rights can be  shown to  be significant, suggests that  plot-level tenure
security, rather than credit supply effects accruing to the household as a whole, are likely to be at the root
of this relationship between tenure security and investment.
Results from China confirm the importance of tenure security for investment. Comparing plots planted to
the same crop within the same household but under different tenure regimes, it is found that farmers tend
to apply more manure and labor, and obtain significantly higher yields, on plots that are privately owned
and therefore  more  secure (Rozelle et  al.  1996). This is the  case even though  the possible  impact of
"' Using comparative  statics from a simple  model it can be shown  that communal  as compared  to individual  tenure is more desirable  from the
individual's  point of view as the discount  rate increases;  the productivity  increase  generated  by investment  is smaller  compared  to rent; the initial
probability  of eviction  is low; and  the probability  of recovering  investment  even  after eviction  is high.  A combination  of these factors may cause
individuals  under indigenous  tenure to commit resources  to land improvement  beyond what would be the case under individual resource
ownership.
9greater tenure security on crop choice (shifting to orchards instead of growing maize)  is not accounted
for. Similarly, Yao (1996) finds that higher levels of tenure security in Chinese villages have a strong and
very significant investment-enhancing impact (application of green manure).12 Analysis of the impact of
higher tenure  security through land titling  in the Brazilian Amazon yields similar  results (Alston  et al.
1995 and 1996) and there  is considerable amount of more anecdotal evidence on a positive association
between availability of title and farm output or investment (see Binswanger et al. 1995 for references).
On the other hand in Niger,  a more land-abundant setting, different degrees of tenure security between
plots with full private ownership  and plots  held under  usufruct, do  not give rise  to  large  statistically
significant differences in application of manure, a medium term yield improving investment (Gavian and
Fafchamps  1996). In this  context, farmers apply significantly  lower  amounts of manure  on  rented as
compared to owned plots, but there  is no significant difference between parcels held under full private
ownership and those held under "traditional" usufruct. The conclusion is that apparently tenure security
on the latter is high enough for farmers to expect to be able to reap the benefits from their (medium term)
investment. At a more general level, it indicates that, in order to determine whether specific property right
arrangements  are  conducive  to  higher  levels  of  investment,  more  detailed  study  is  necessary  and
generalizations are unlikely to be helpful. What is instead required is a more differentiated judgment  that
takes account of the time horizon of the investment, the opportunity cost of the resources used, and the
size and distribution over time of the expected payoff associated with the investment.
Transferability
Land markets tend to be highly localized. As a consequence, the ability to transfer  land between users
may be of limited importance in early stages of development when there  is little heterogeneity of skills
across the population and non-agricultural opportunities are limited. However, the importance and value
of  being  able  to  transfer  use  or  ownership  rights  to  land  increase  with  economic  development,
specialization, and better development of other markets. In this case, the transfer of land from those who
have  lower productivity to those who are able to  make more productive  use of the  land  improves the
overall  resource  allocation. The  demand  for  such exchanges  increases  further  as  the  rural  economy
becomes  more  integrated  geographically,  facilitating  transactions  between  individuals  who  are  not
members  of the  same  community.  Such  situations  generally  involve  larger  problems  of  asymmetric
This does not necessarily imply that actions to increase tenure security are warranted or even needed (Platteau, 1998).
12 At first glance this would seem to be at variance with the finding by Feder et al. (1992) who find that, for a similar sample from four Chinese
provinces,  neither  short-term  nor long-term  tenure  security  -captured  by farmers' perception  about  the  possibility  that  their  land  may  be
reallocated before the expiration of the current 15-year contract.One can reconcile the two findings by noting thatFeder et al.'s  study considers
non-attached investment (machinery, livestock, and construction) which should not be aftected  by individual plots'  tenure security, that access to
10information and greater benefits from more formal systems of land ownership recording.  If the ability to
liquidate investments  (through  land  transfers)  increases the  incentive to  undertake  such  investments,
higher levels of transfer rights, and the greater ability to affect transfers which is entailed in formal land
rights systems, will not only improve resource allocation but will also be associated with higher levels of
investment and labor use by individual cultivators.
The only data that allow testing of this hypothesis come from China where one observes variability  in
systems of transfer rights in different communities (Carter and Yao, 1998). Results suggest that  higher
levels of transfer  rights increase  investment (application of green manure). In addition,  evidence from
China indicates that higher levels of transfer rights also induce a better allocation of the households labor
endowments  in response,  for  example, to  outside  employment  opportunities. Households  with  higher
levels of transfer rights apply less labor on their farm and devote more time to more remunerative off-
farm  activities  (Yao  1998), thereby  contributing  to  equalization of factor  ratios  within  a village  and
increasing  overall  efficiency.  More  indirect  support  for  an  important  efficiency-increasing  (but  not
investment enhancing) impact of higher transfer rights is provided by Rozelle et al. (1997) who find that
an  increase  in off-farm  opportunities  narrowed the  difference  between  labor  spent on  (transferable)
private and (non-transferable) communal plots.13
Credit access
In addition to inducing investment, secure land ownership is likely to increase the supply of credit from
the formal credit system to undertake such investment. The reason is that, because of its immobility and
virtual  indestructibility, land with secure, clearly defined, and easily transferable  ownership rights is an
ideal collateral. The provision of a collateral -facilitated  by possession of formal land title-  is generally a
necessary condition for participation in formal credit markets for medium and long-term credit. In fact,
there  is  evidence  of  titles  facilitating  access  to  informal  (but  impersonal)  credit  markets  as  well
(Siamwalla  et  al.,  1993).  Existence  of  well  documented  and  transferable  property  rights  and  of
institutional  arrangements  to  facilitate the  low-cost  transfer  of  land  are  likely to  make  an  important
contribution to the development of financial markets.
However, while use  of titled  land  as collateral  can,  under the  condition  that  foreclosure  is socially
feasible, reduce a bank's  default risk and thereby enhance credit supply, it will have little impact on the
working capital emerged as being an important determinant,  and that the subjective measure of tenure security used by them is more noisy than
the index of land tenure security used by Yao.
'"  Evidence is not uniform: for Ghana, the hypothesis that sales and rental rights do not have a significant impact on investnent  decisions can not
be rejected  (Besley 1995).  This  suggests that the prospect of being able to transfer land more easily through sales and rental markets  in the
future is, in this environment, not an important consideration in individuals' decision to effect land-related investment.
11transaction costs associated with administering credit to small producers in rural areas. In environments
where these costs are high, the improved credit-worthiness brought about by possession of land title may
therefore  not be enough to facilitate  access to formal credit  by small  farmers. Unless  complementary
measures to reduce transaction costs and ensure access to credit by this group are undertaken alongside
with individualized property rights through titling, the benefits from titling programs may accrue only to
medium and large landowners.
The importance of the credit supply effect associated with provision of land title is supported by evidence
from Feder et al.'s  (1988) study in Thailand, where farmers'  opinions  and econometric evidence point
towards  improved credit supply as the main  benefit from titling. Land ownership titles  induced higher
investment in farming  capital (attached  investments and other capital),14 titled  land  had  signiificantly
higher market values and higher productivity per unit. In three of the four provinces covered, households'
credit supply had been significantly enhanced by the availability of title. By contrast, and in line with the
above, title was found to  have  little impact  on either  investment or farm  income where  formal  credit
markets were not available (Atwood 1990, Carter and Wiebe, 1994; Migot Adholla et al. 1994).15
Additional evidence from a study based on panel date from Paraguay indicate that titling had a positive
income or  productivity  enhancing  effect  through  credit  market  benefits  for  at  least  some groups  of
farmers. Due to a strong impact of formal title on both credit supply and investment demand, the benefits
from title  are relatively  large  (about  10% of farm  income), and  significantly  higher than  the cost  of
titling,.  However, the  impact of awarding titles was strongly size-differentiated.  Estimates  indicate that
producers below 20 hectares remained rationed out of the credit market and therefore did not benefit at all
from the credit-supply effect of title (Carter and Olinto, 1996).
This  differential  impact suggests that,  in environments where  other  markets  (such  as credit  markets)
entail distortions which put smaller and poorer farmers at a disadvantage, individual property rights on
equity, and -in the medium to longer term- on the direction and nature of land transfers between different
size classes  of producers, could  imply greater inequity. Whether,  in the  presence of heterogeneity  in
endowments, small  producers will benefit from such policies depends critically on the ability to reduce,
together with titling, transaction costs and policy induced distortions that limit access to credit markets.
4  Problems  of endogeneity  and self-selection are circumvented by  drawing  samples from squatter  villages in  areas nominally  under  public
ownership (where titles could not be awarded) and private areas where all residents already had obtained titles.
"  Pender  and Kerr (1996)  show that  for India land  ownership has little impact on credit supply,  a fact that  is attributed to  severe non-price
rationing. Nonetheless, land values for titled land are on average about  15% higher than for untitled land, suggesting  that possession of formal
title reduces the probability of land loss for potential buyers.
122.2.2  Costs
The most obvious cost associated with formal definition  of property rights in land is the expenditure
needed to physically demarcate and delineate plots, to establish  and maintain accurate records of land
ownership,  and to enforce  these rights and resolve  whatever  disputes  might arise.1 6 These  costs are borne
by individual  land owners in situations,  for example  frontier settlement,  where public enforcement  of
property  rights is absent and individuals  make defensive  investments  such as guards, fences, and other
demarcation  devices to demonstrate  the legitimacy  of their claims to property  and to defend such rights
against possible intruders (Muller, 1997). It has been shown that the privately "optimal" amount of
spending  by individuals  on means  of protection  will be inefficient  from a social point of view (Feder and
Feeny;  de Meza  and Gould  1992).  Furthermore,  the defensive  activities undertaken  often have little social
value and may generate negative externalities,  an issue that has been emphasized  with respect to the
Brazilian  Amazon  where  the need  to demonstrate  "productive"  land use to establish  ownership  claims has
been  linked  to increased  deforestation  (Binswanger  1988,  Southgate  et al. 1991).  Even  where they are not
associated with externalities,  defensive activities that are often undertaken in speculative attempts to
secure  "ownership"  of large tracts of land,  can lead to complete  dissipation  of the rents to be had (Allen
1991).17
Given  the undesirable  impacts  of private rights enforcement,  public  provision  -in the form of land  records,
police,  and a judiciary-  would  therefore  be preferable  in all situations  except  ones characterized  by very low
levels  of population  density  (Malik  and Schwab,  1992).  This is indeed  observed  throughout  human  history.
The specific  form in which land records  are established  will still depend  on the relative  costs and benefits
from such an activity - something that depends partially on the technology and infrastructure available for
record keeping.  1  8 At initial stages of human development assignments of property rights appear to have
been handled orally by the community (with community functionaries holding public sessions at the gate,
for example). However, the benefits from keeping written records seem to have been so great that across a
large number of cultures, officially validated land records are among the first documents to appear once a
written  language had  been  developed  (Ellickson  1993).19 In  addition to  establishing  unambiguous
ownership rights, written records do allow to verify the ownership status of land at low cost, thus reducing
the  scope for  asymmetric information about ownership and quality of land and  making  land sales and
16 Note that the number  of disputes  is itself  endogenous,  depending  on the type of property  rights system  chosen.
''  Spontaneous  collective  action to limit the dissipation  of resource rents associated  with individualized  defense of property rights has been
observed  in a number  of cases  where  group  sizes  were small (Umbeck,  1977).
'  Ellickson  (1993)  notes that historically  the establishment  of formal  land rights  is closely  related  to the emergence  and widespread  use of written
language;  in many  cultures  records  of land  transactions  were  among  the  first  texts  that have  been  officially  recorded.
i  See, for example  the  Indian  Arthsastra  from  the  4th Century  BC as well as references  in the  Bible  relating  to the  period  600  BC.
13rentals cheaper to implement. This reduction of transaction costs would increase the  liquidity of the land
market and could bring the number of efficiency-enhancing transactions closer to the optimum, i.e. helping
to transfer more land from less productive to more productive individuals.
A second type of social cost associated with fully individualized property rights relates to the fact that, at
low levels of development, communal land ownership may perform an important insurance function that
would be eliminated by establishing fully individualized property rights in land.20 Furthermore,  it has
long been known that in cases where other markets are highly incomplete, land sales markets may not
automatically transfer land to more productive users. In such situations, individualization of  land rights
could be doubly disadvantageous (see Platteau, 1998 for references). On the one hand it could pave the
way for the emergence of sales markets that deprive traditional communities of their source of livelihood
(often without adequate compensation), thus generating social unrest  and violence  and eliminating an
important form of insurance. On the other hand, where land rights are introduced in such an environment,
productivity  will not necessarily  increase as availability of  land rights could  induce  concentration  of
landholdings by a privileged minority of wealthy individuals who -for example by having access to non-
covariate  sources  of  income-  are in  a  position  to  accumulate land  for  speculative  purposes  without
making productive use of this asset.2 1
Historical evidence does indeed suggest that, in situations where other markets are not well developed or
where policy-induced distortions affect the functioning of land markets, increased transferability of land
may  deprive  the  poor  of an  important  social  safety net.  The importance  of the  insurance  aspect  is
confirmed by the fact that, even where  societies have made the transition to individualized  land rights,
they have often maintained land-related social safety nets to provide insurance for the poor. One example
for  a mechanism to  do  so is to  allow continuing uses of communal  pastures  and  forest  areas of  low
productive  value as well as an universal right to collect leftovers after the harvest or graze  animals on
harvested  fields. Another  one is the  provision for  periodic  redistribution of  at  least part of the  land
available to the community - for example the Bible mandates land redistribution every 50 years.22 Such
redistribution of cultivation rights is likely to decrease productive efficiency by attenuating  individuals'
2'  Jodha (1990) provides evidence on the importance of access to the commons as a safety net for the poor. Based on  panel data from China,
Burgess (1997) finds that the equitable  allocation of land use rights under communal tenure has an effect  similar to a lump sum transfer that
provide insurance against low nutritional  outcomes in a way that is more incentive-compatible than arex post  redistribution.  The fact that land
ownership has a more significant  impact on improving  nutrition than on  income can be explained  by the fact that, with  imperfect rural grain
markets, considerable  cash outlays  would be required to  achieve a similar effect through  market purchases  of grain. The presence  of equity
benefits  from periodic  redistribution  of land  rights  in  China would  be consistent  with  peasants'  strong support  for  the  system  of periodic
redistribution (Kung, 1995).
21 Note that this is historically well-founded, as the many examples in Binswanger et al. (1995) demonstrate.
22 If incentive structures and enforcement mechanisms to ensure that such provisions are actually  implemented at the local level are non-existent,
the provision for regular redistribution  can  actually give way to  arbitrary behavior and rent extraction by local leaders.  For a theoretical  and
empirical discussion of these issues see Tumer et al. (1998).
14incentive to  make  plot-specific  investments.  The fact  that  societies  have been  willing to  incur these
efficiency  losses suggests that the subjective valuation of the benefits in terms of avoiding widespread
landlessness,  social  destitution,  and  discontent,  has  been  high.  This  implies that  where  land  is  an
important asset for poor and  marginal groups, both social and efficiency  aspects  associated with land
rights  need to  be accounted  for  in assessing  the potential  benefits  from  individualizing  land  tenure
arrangements.
3  LAND MARKETS:  FUNCTIONING  AND EFFICIENCY IMPLICATIONS
If there  are differences in individuals' skills and endowments of different factors of production, markets
should help in optimizing factor proportions employed  and thus increase overall efficiency of resource
allocation. This section aims to outline the main determinants that would affect participation in the land sales
or the land rental market, and based on this to elaborate on links and differences between these two markets,
in terms of their impact on equity and efficiency of resource allocation.
The productivity advantage of small farmers who rely predominantly on family labor rather than on  less
motivated hired workers who have to be supervised would imply that, in the absence of imperfections in
other markets, a functioning land  market should facilitate efficiency- and equity-enhancing transfers from
large to small producers - or from ones with lower management skills to better operators. However, land
sales transactions could be efficiency decreasing if, due to policy induced credit market distortions, large
owners' advantage in accessing credit would offset the productivity advantage of owner operators or if, due
to the inability to insure, significant land holdings are not part of poor people's optimal asset portfolioZ 3
Thus,  before actions to  activate the land  market are undertaken, careful empirical  investigation of the
functioning of financial markets and insurance mechanism, and possibly steps to improve their functioning,
might be in order.
Even if imperfections in markets for credit and insurance reduce the scope for the land sales market to bring
about improved land allocation through land transfers from large to small producers, such allocation should-
in a frictionless world- be facilitated through the land rental market. One possibility would be an interlinked
contract whereby the landlord uses the credit access provided by land ownership to provide the tenant with
working capital as part of the rental contract.  High transaction costs -part  of them related to government
regulation-  reduce  the  extent  of  land  rental  transactions  in  a  number  of  countries.  Examining  the
23  Indeed, there is descriptive evidence indicating that in environments with imperfect credit market access, e.g. in  Africa, land sales markets
result in an efficiency-reducing transfer of land from small to large producers (Collier 1989).
15implication of regulations in more detail would be of importance as removing unjustified interventions is
likely to go a long way towards improving resource allocation in agricultural systems characterized by very
unequal land distribution. Most rental markets in developing countries involve some form of share tenancy.
While this arrangement does not lead to full efficiency, it is a second best solution given risk and imperfect
capital markets. The sections below elaborate these points and review relevant evidence.
3.1  KEY  DETERMINANTS  OF  LAND  MARKET  PARTICIPATION
The shadow price of land for  different types of heterogeneous agents is determined by the  agricultural
production function, the households' inherent managerial ability, and by a number of imperfections in labor,
credit, and land markets that are common in rural areas. If credit and land rental markets were perfect, the
supervision costs associated with the use of hired labor would make smaller farms more productive, and
would  lead households to lease in or lease out the amount of land required to maintain a uniform ratio of
family labor endowment to operated area, irrespectively of the land ownership distribution (Feder 1985).
However, imperfections in other markets may change this, with implications for the functioning of land
rental  and sales markets. If, in the presence of credit  market imperfections, supply of working capital
depends on the amount of land owned, the optimal size of the operational holding would vary systematically
with  size of the  owned holding even  if land  rental markets were perfect. While  the magnitude  (and
direction) of this effect would depend on the elasticity of output with respect to effective labor and of labor
effort with respect to supervision, it can overwhelm the productivity advantage of family farmers and give
rise to a positive relationship between owned farm size and productivity. In addition to this, capital and
insurance market imperfections may also  affect the  production activities of poor producers - possibly
leading them to pursue less risky but also less productive activities.  Below we review the factors which
affect the productivity of farmers, and thus determine their demand for land.
Economies of scale: The presence or absence of economies of scale would systematically affect the shadow
price of land for different farm-size classes. Possible economies of scale could arise from the presence of
indivisible factors of production or cost elements leadingto an initial range of farm size where the average
cost of production declines with farm size.  In cases where other markets function reasonably well, optimal
farm sizes tend not to exceed the scale at which family labor is fully occupied (utilizing seasonal hired labor
for specific tasks).2 4 Agricultural activities where significant economies of scale in the production process
24  A large number of empirical  studies  (e.g. Olson-Lanjouw  1995 for  India, Feder et al.  1992 and Burgess  1997 for  China,  Olinto  1995 for
Paraguay) are indeed unable to reject the hypothesis of constant retums to scale in agricultural production.
16exist are few.25 Some economies of scale are associated with the processing and  marketing of many
agricultural products, but this does not have important implications for the unit cost of farming operations
as  long as competitive  markets for outputs and  inputs exist.  Alternatively, access to  such markets  is
sometimes arranged through cooperatives. Only for a few "plantation crops" such as sugarcane, bananas,
or tea could the need for immediate large-scale processing or marketing transmit economies of scale from
the processing stage to production. To reap the economies of scale associated with the former, production
of these crops is generally organized on a scale that corresponds to the optimum scale of the processing
factory.26
Labor supervision cost:  Constant returns to scale would imply that the size of agricultural operations has
little impact on  productivity. However, the  need to  supervise hired  labor would  confer a  productivity
advantage on owner-operated farm units. The fundamental reason for this is the presence of agency costs
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976), which result from the need to manage wage labor and enforce effort in large-
scale  operations. The lack of incentives for wage workers to  exert  effort, and the  consequent need to
supervise labor or to offer incentive contracts, has received considerable  attention in industrial organization
literature (Jensen and Meckling 1976), and is recognized to have profound implications for the organization
of production and for the optimal size of the firm (Calvo and Wellisz, 1978; Eswaran and Kotwal 1985a and
1985b). The cost of supervision is particularly large in agricutural production due to spatial dispersion of
the production process and the need to constantly adjust to micro-variations of the natural environment.
Family members are residual claimants to profits and thus have higher incentives to provide effort than hired
labor. 27 They share in farm risk, and can be employed without incurring hiring or search costs. These
attributes underlie the general superiority of family farming over large-scale wage operations, manifested
empirically in an inverse relationship between farm size and productivity. A large number of studies based
on  aggregate, or cross-sectional, and panel data have confirmed the  existence of the  inverse farm-size
productivity  relationship for all but the smallest farm size classes (Berry and Cline  1973, Carter  1984,
Benjamin  1995, Newell  et  al  1997, Kutcher  and  Scandizzo  1981, Olinto  1995, Burgess  1997, Udry
1997).28  Thus, unless there  are other countervailing forces, one would expect land markets to transfer
land from large to small producers.  We turn now to discuss these countervailing effects.
2  Exceptions are limited to cases of highly specialized machinery, specialized livestock production,  or plantation crops where economies of scale are
transmitted from the marketing to the production stage.
26  However,  the supervision  advantages  of pwner-operators have  in  many  cases  motivated  large  processors  to  contract  production  out  to
smallholders under outgrower or contract farming schemes, often providing credit in kind as well as technical assistance (Glover 1990).
27  Empirical evidence confirms that family labor is more productive than hired labor, and that the intensity of supervision by family members
affects the performance of hired labor (Frisvold 1994).
28 Bhalla and Roy (1989) and Benjamin (1992) have shown that from cross-section analyses (e.g. Berry and Cline  1973, Carter 1984, Newell et al
1997, Kutcher and Scandizzo 1979) tend to overestimate the productivity advantage of smaller farms if soil quality is not specifically accounted
for.
17Credit market access: A key reason for land markets' transfer from large to small producers to be rarely
observed is that it is very difficult for small farmers to access markets for credit and  insurance.29 This
implies that, on the one hand, the value of accessing credit markets is capitalized in land prices, making it
very difficult  to  acquire  land  in the  sales  market with  the  expectation  of  paying  off  the  debt  from
agricultural profits alone without recourse to equity.  On the other hand, credit market imperfections that
increase the shadow price of credit for small producers would reduce small farmers'  competitiveness  in
the land sales market and at the same time outweigh the supervision cost advantage they enjoy.
Asymmetric information and moral hazard lead generally to quantity rationing in credit markets (Stiglitz
and  Weiss,  1981). Formal  credit  markets  can  overcome the  problem  of  asymmetric  information  by
utilizing a  collateral  requirement.  However, the costs of and political  impediments to  foreclosure on
smallholders land are often quite significant. This is part of the generally high transaction costs associated
with providing credit to small producers. In informal credit markets, close familiarity and social control is
used to select promising clients or projects. This is quite costly as the scope for effective supervision is
limited. Furthermore,  informal  lenders have  only  limited scope  to diversify  covariate  risks,  and they
typically do not provide much long term credit.  Interest rates on informal loans are thus high. Thus, both
limited availability  of credit  and high  cost of borrowing of credit  and  high cost  of borrowing would
prevent those whio  do not have accumulated savings from acquiring land. 30
Credit market imperfections can thus offset  small farmers'  supervision cost advantage. For the case  of
Sudan, for example, yields for virtually all crops are lower for poor (small) farmers and higher for rich
(large) farmers, thus turning the farm-size productivity relationship upside down. Furthermore, the lanid
rental market leads to  land transfers from poor and  labor-abundant small  holders, to rich and relatively
labor scarce households (Kevane 1996). The reason is that capital market imperfections combined with
reasonably functioning land and labor markets and a technology that is not supervision intensive make it
more attractive  for small  credit-constrained households to  rent out land and work  for  a wage than to
engage  in owner-cultivation without capital  inputs. By  contrast,  in panel  data from  Burkina  Faso an
inverse farm size-productivity relationship was observed even though a positive presence of correlation
between yields  and  cash  inflows from  non-agricultural  employment  suggests the  presence  of capital
market  imperfections  (Udry  1996). The  conclusion  is that  imperfections  in  land,  labor,  credit,  and
29  Due to the covariance of production risks, crop insurance is very difficult and forward markets to insure against price risk are often unavailable
to small producers due to high transaction costs.
The difficulty of land acquisition through borrowing by would-be smallholders, in spite of their productivity  advantage, has been highlighted
by  Binswanger  and Elgin  (1998)  and Carter and Mesbah  (1995).  Furthermore, they  point out  that  by  exhausting  access to  credit  for  land
acquisition, the ability to borrow for working capital is eliminated.
18insurance markets have to be analyzed together. Efforts at land redistribution that do not simultaneously
address credit market imperfections may be costly and ineffective.
Portfolio composition: Small producers' inability to access formal markets for credit and insurance often
forces  them  to  adopt costly  insurance substitutes, one  of which  is the  adjustment  of crop  and  asset
portfolios  to  a  low  return  -low  risk  combination.31 In  order to  ensure  satisfaction  of  a  minimum
subsistence requirement during periods of distress, credit-constrained producers could hold a portfolio of
less risky but also less productive assets than unconstrained producers. In particular,  small holders may
demonstrate  a  lower  demand  for  land  than  that which  would  seem to  be justified  by  their  potential
productive advantage. Zimmerman and Carter (1996) use parameters from Burkina Faso to  show that,
starting from an egalitarian distribution of land, production risk together with covariance of land prices,
leads to successive concentration of land via sales from more productive small producers to relatively less
productive  large farmers. This illustrates that  improving the functioning  of land sales markets  will not
necessarily lead to better resource allocation if other markets'  distortions are not tackled.32
Transaction costs: A further factor that might prevent land markets from achieving a first-best allocation is
the transaction cost associated with land sales and rentals. It has often been observed (see, for example,
Balcazar 1993, Carter and Zegarra, 1995) that, especially in countries with a dualistic distribution of land
ownership, land sales markets are highly segmented in the sense that, despite a considerable frequency of
land transactions within farm size groups, land sales across farm-size class-boundaries are virtually absent.
One explanation is that transaction cost entailed in subdividing farms so as to enable to a multitude of small
holders  is  high.  Similarly, the  fact  that  certain  costs  (e.g.  formal  registration)  associated  with  land
transactions are independent of the size of the purchase creates indivisibilities that would either discourage
small land transactions or drive them into informality where such costs are not incurred.
While the discussion of costs associated with land rentals in the literature is less extensive, government
regulations appear to have reduced the amount of land leasing below what would take place otherwise. Even
in countries that avoided the imposition of explicit restrictions on tenancy, which (as discussed below) were
associated with significant efficiency  losses, the threat  of expropriative land reform  in many countries
implied that renting out land to more productive smaller producers exposed the landlord to a considerable
risk of losing ownership rights in the course of land reform. To prevent this from happening, many landlords
Examples are provided by Rosenzweig andWolpin  (1995), Dercon (1996), Dercon and Krishnan  (1996),  and Rosenzweig  and Binswanger
(1993).
32 The fact that study of land markets can not be divorced from the functioning of other markets has beeremphasize by Basu (1986) in a model
of "interim" land transactions  which explicitly serve as a credit substitute. In this context, the supply  of land for sale would increases with the
probability  of being able  to buy  back the land, the  attractiveness of other (financial)  assets as compared to  land, and the need  for  liquidity.
Sengupta (1997) draws out the implications of limited liability on contract choice within a more general set of contractual options.
19appear to have evicted tenants altogether, resorting instead to mechanization, cattle ranching, or cultivation
using a hired labor force (de Janvry and Sadoulet, 1993). The implications for land rentals, although they
have not been rigorously quantified in any of the cases, appear to have been considerable.
3.2  LAND SALES  MARKETS
The discussion of the previous section implies that credit market imperfections tend to cause the equilibrium
price of land to be above the capitalized value of the income stream that can be generated by an individual
who has to rely on full mortgage-based land acquisition. In addition, policy distortions will tend to increase
the wedge between the price of land and the capitalized value of the income from agricultural production.
Use  of land  as an inflation hedge,  as well  as credit  subsidies and  tax  advantages that  allow the  use
agricultural activities as a tax shelter are examples (Gunjal et al. 1996; Brandao and Rezende 1992; Just and
Miranowski 1989; Feldstein 1980).  To the degree that such distortions confer disproportionate benefits to
larger landholders (as in the case of tax advantages which are generally of no relevance to the poor), this
would further bias the operation of the land sales market against redistributing land to landless or marginal
landowning households who could have a productivity advantage  as family farmers.
Analysis of land market transactions and offer and asking prices in Paraguay indicates the presence of a
large gap  between willingness to sell and willingness to pay,33 significant  differences  in such  prices
across farm sizes, and very distinct regional patterns of land market performance depending whether or
not other markets exist and how well they function (Carter and Zegarra 1996). Both reported and actual
sales prices are downward sloping over the 1-40 hectare range (indicating superior productivity of small
farmers) in traditionally settled zones in the country's  interior, but not at the frontier where the labor cost
advantage  of  family  farms  was  overshadowed  by  capital  market  imperfections.  Simulations  using
regression parameters suggest that the productivity advantage of small farmers would manifest  itself in
the  land purchase market  only  if land market  reform was combined with  improved  access to capital
markets. A similar conclusion is implied by the observation that the degree to which  financial markets
were  accessible  to  small  producers  was  (together  with the  initial  distribution  of  assets  and  the
characteristics  of the production  system) one of the key factors  that determined  the response  of  land
accumulation patterns to agro-export booms in Guatemala and Chile (Carter and Barham  1996).
Willingness to sell was significantly  higher than was willing to pay to purchase land but the gap decreases with farm size (from 50% for the
smallest farms to 20% for medium sized units). This could be in indication for labor market imperfections, i.e. the value  given to land as a source
for self-employment, in addition to small farmers' unwillingness to be bought out.
20Exposure to undiversifiable  residual  risk causes farmers to resort to  liquidation of their assets  during
periods of severe crisis, a phenomenon commonly referred to as distress sales. This is implies that the
covariance of weather risks for the farming population causes land prices to be low (due to insignificant
effective demand and high supply) during bad crop years, with the consequence that individuals who had
to sell off land during crises may not be able to repurchase land during subsequent periods of recovery
(Bidinger et  al.  1994). Distress sales have  not only played a  major role historically  in shaping more
concentrated land ownership pattems, but are also linked to the elimination of traditional mechanisms for
coping with risk in the literature (Kranton and Swamy 1997;  Brockett 1984)34
The link between unmitigated production risk and distress sales is highlighted by Cain (1981) who examines
the  implications of different insurance mechanisms on distress sales and the  land ownership distribution
between 1960 to 1980 for predominantly agricultural  villages in India and Bangladesh. These villages faced
very high production risks but were characterized by distinct differences in mechanisms of risk-insurance: In
Maharashtra,  India,  an  employment  guarantee  scheme  operated  throughout  the  period  and  attained
participation rates of up to 97 percent of all households during disasters. Such schemes were absent after the
major flood episodes in Bangladesh. Thus, 60 percent of land sales in Bangladesh were undertaken to obtain
food and medicine, undoubtedly due at least in part to the lack of other insurance mechanisms. About 60
percent of the currently landless had lost their land since 1960 and the Gini coefficient of landownership
distribution increased from 0.6 to almost 0.7.  This contrasts sharply with the Indian villages, where land
sales to finance consumption expenditures accounted only for 14 percent of sales and were incurred mainly
by the rich to meet social obligations.  On the other hand, 64 percent of land sales were undertaken in order
to generate capital for  productive investment (digging of wells, purchase of pump  sets, and children's
education), and the land sales market actually contributed to a slight equalization of the land-ownership
distribution. This suggests that in this case the poor were not only able to avoid distress sales, but were able,
through  access  to  cash-generating employment,  to  acquire  some  land  as  rich  households  liquidated
agricultural assets to be able to pursue non-agricultural investment. Survey data on  land transactions from
India indicate that purchases of land are almost all undertaken by individuals with access to sources of
income which are not correlated with agricultural production and that borrowing to finance agricultural land
acquisition is virtually non-existent (Sarap 1995).
34  Distress sales have been  important in China (Shih  1992) in early Japan  (Takekoshi 1967) in the  Indian Punjab  (Hamid 1983), and in Latin
America following the abolition of communal tenure (Brockett 1984).
213.3  LAND RENTAL  MARKETS
As the discussion above illustrated, land sales markets will not necessarily lead to an optimal allocation of
land in the presence of credit and insurance market imperfections. However, improved resource allocation
can be achieved through land tenancy contracts even when other markets are incomplete.  Analysis shows
clearly that land rental markets serve an important function in equalizing returns to non-tradable factors of
production such as family  labor and bullocks (Skoufias 1991).35 Given the  huge diversity of tenancy
arrangements, we need first to explain the wide range of tenancy contracts that is empirically observed in
developing  countries. This  gives rise  to  the  second  issue,  namely to  investigate  in  more  detail  the
implications of these contracts for the efficiency of resource allocation.
Assume a constant returns to  scale production function Q  O  OF(e,h)  where Q is output, e  is effort, h is
number of tenants, and 0 is a stochastic element. Then the range of contracts can be summarized as follows.
The landlord's income is y = h[(1-a)Q - f3],  and the representative tenant's income is Y=aQ + P. The fixed
rent contract is given by  {(a-1,f3<0},  the pure wage contract is represented by  {7=0,P>0}; and the share
contract is given by {O<a<1},  with the sign and magnitude of f3  a function of the landlord's choice of a and
the tenant's reservation utility level (Otsuka et al. 1992).
Under conditions of certainty and the assumption that tenants' effort can be monitored and enforced, the
specific choice of contract type does not matter as all contracts lead to equivalent outcomes (Cheung 1969).
If  the  assumption  of  perfect  effort  enforceability is  dropped,  and  under  conditions  of  certainty  (or
equivalently, risk neutrality), only the fixed rent contract is optimal because in all other cases tenants receive
only a fraction of their marginal product, which would induce them to exert less than the optimal amount of
effort (where the marginal disutility is equal to the full marginal benefit from this action). Any type  of
contract other than fixed rent would result in undersupply of effort by the producer (tenant or worker), which
would lower total production.
Indeed, fixed-rent tenancy is widespread in all developed countries such as the US and Canada, where about
one third of the agricultural land is cultivated by tenants. The fact that virtually all of this land is rented
under fixed term contract suggests that such an arrangement would be a relatively efficient way of achieving
optimal  operational holding sizes  in economies with  well  functioning credit,  risk,  and  labor  markets.
However, where markets for credit and insurance are highly incomplete and where the rural landless class is
large, as is the case in most developing countries, adoption of a fixed rent contract where rent is paid up-
"Land  rental transactions  to circumvent imperfections in credit markets have been important in West Africa in the past (Robertson  1982), and
continue  to be observed  in a number  of developing  countries  where  credit  markets are absent  or credit is highly  rationed.  Usufruct  mortgage  is
22front (or -equivalently-  independent of the output of production) may not be feasible or optimal from the
perspective of all parties to the transaction.
In such a situation, two main reasons, risk sharing and limited tenant wealth, could mitigate against adoption
of the fixed rent contract and in favor of a sharecropping contract. 36 Although it would reduce the incentive
to exert  effort, a  share contract provides the possibility of partly  insuring a  risk-averse tenant  against
fluctuations in output. Where, in risky environments, a risk-averse tenant faces significant uninsured risk, a
share contract may well provide the tenant with higher expected utility and thus be adopted despite the lower
aggregate productivity involved. In fact, it can be shown that in this case, the Pareto optimal outcome will
always require a trade-off between the risk-reducing properties of the fixed-wage contract, under which the
tenant's residual risk is zero, and the incentive effects of the  fixed-rent contract, which would result in
optimal effort supply but no insurance (Otsuka et al.). Given risk aversion and  incomplete intertemporal
markets, a one-period contract is a second-best solution. Part of this shortcoming can be eliminated by state-
contingent side payments in the context of a repeated game37
Limited tenant wealth increases the landlord's risk when a fixed-rent contract does not involve a front-end
payment. In case of a disaster (such as a bad climatic shock) tenants with insufficient wealth are likely to
default on the rent payment, implying that landlords will tend to enter into fixed rent contracts only with
tenants who are wealthy enough to pay the rent under all possible output realizations. If tenants are poor,
it will be optimal for the landlord to chose a share rather than a fixed rent contract (Shetty 1988). In a one
period game this would imply that landlords would rank tenants by wealth, choosing to enter into contract
only with the wealthiest  tenants. Empirical  evidence reported by Quibria  and Rashid  (1986) confirms
such behavior. By implication, the efficiency of any particular tenancy contract is  increasing in tenant
wealth and the overall efficiency of the tenancy market would depend on the initial wealth distribution of
potential tenants, generating a direct mapping between the distribution of wealth and economic efficiency
(Bardhan et al. 1997). In a repeated game, landlords would allow all but the least wealthy tenants to earn
positive profits in equilibrium, thus using the threat of contract termination (or eviction) as a device to
elicit effort supply.
An extension of this  argument  is provided by Mookherjee (1997), who  shows that  in the  context of
bargaining on the terms of an interlinked tenancy contract between landlord and tenant the efficiency of
still reported to be common  in Bangladesh (Cain 1981), Java  (Morooka and Hayami  1986), and Thailand (Fujimoto  1988). In the Philippines,
tenancy transactions emerged as a credit substitute in response to limitations on the transferability of land (Nagarajan and associates, 1991).
1  A third rationale for adoption of the share contract, namely that imperfect  information  on tenants' unobservable  characteristics such as ability, causes
landlords to use sharecropping contracts as a screening device where the tenants' acceptance of certain types of contracts provides a signal for their
productive ability (Newbery  and Stiglitz 1979)  does, at least for Indian data, not conform well with the data (Olson-Lanjouw 1995).
23the contract, i.e. the amount of effort exerted, will always be higher under operator-ownership of the land
than under tenant-landlord relationship.3 8 This would imply that redistribution of land from the landlord
to  the tenant  - or any  other  measure (e.g.  increased off-farm opportunities)  that  would  increase the
tenant's  reservation utility - would be associated with an increase in aggregate productivity. Still, while
such a redistribution could increase the aggregate utility of both parties (thus making compensation of the
landlord a theoretical  possibility),  a voluntary market-based transfer of  land from the  landlord to the
farmer is not feasible. The intuition is simple - since a credit-based land purchase does not enhance the
tenants'  wealth, the limited liability constraint will still be applicable and the debt overhang incurred by
the cultivator to purchase the land will reduce the incentive to apply effort instead of just  defaulting on
the loan. However, a non-market transfer of land from landlords to farmers could be associated with an
increase in overall productivity as well as aggregate welfare.
Insights on the relationship between liquid assets and contractual parameters are provided by Laffont and
Matoussi (1994). Their results  suggest that direct dependence of the optimal choice of contract on the
working capital available to  both landlord and tenant may  account for the  coexistence of  a  variety of
contracts  in  the  same  environment  among  parties  with  roughly  similar  risk  aversion  but  different
endowments of working capital.39 The positive relation between the crop share and the tenant's working
capital endowment  which  theory would  lead one to  expect even  with  perfect monitoring  of effort  is
indeed observed in the Tunisian data used. Output is shown to increases significantly with tenants' wealth
for  all contract types as well as for share contracts but tenant  wealth has no effect  if only fixed rent
contracts are considered. Similarly, the wealth of the landlord has, as expected, a negative effect on the
tenant's  share and a positive effect on  production under the  share contract but none in other forms of
contractual  arrangements.  Working capital thus  appears to  be a  significant explanation  of the type  of
contract chosen and the production gains achieved on a given plot.
The  importance of potential tenants'  asset  endowment is emphasized by  evidence  from India  which
indicates that, due to wealth constraints, a large number of potential tenants is actually rationed out of the
tenancy market (Shaban  1991). In this context, both the smallest and the largest landholders rent their
land to middle farmers who are neither capital-constrained nor suffering from the disadvantage associated
with the need to supervise hired labor. This illustrates that the ability of the land rental market to bring
1  Sadoulet et al. (1997 and 1994) observe that close kin provide insurance to their tenants and are therefore able to avoid the inefficiency of the
share contract.
"  The scope for other benefits  from a more egalitarian distribution of land ownership that are not directly related to agricultural  productivity is
illustrated by Banerjee et al. 1997.
"  If risk were a major factor in choosing the optimal type of contract, one would observe significant variation in crop  shares according to the
riskiness of the crops grown on particular plots. This is, however, not observed empirically.
24about efficiency-enhancing transfers is constrained by potential tenants'  endowment of assets and other
means of production (bullocks).
Thus,  while  land rental  markets  improve the allocation of resources in the presence  of factor  market
distortions  by bringing  land to  imperfectly or non-tradable  factors  of production  (experience,  family
labor, animal power), the gains are constrained by endowments of potential transactors. In addition, there
is evidence of  fixed transaction  costs  which  preclude  some poor  households that  would  desire  only
relatively  minor adjustments, from entering the tenancy market. Similarly, data from India suggest the
prevalence of imperfect adjustment whereby, on average, farmers realize only about 75% of the desired
level of land transactions (Skoufias 1995). The latter study also indicates that the adjustment effected by
the  land  rental  market  is asymmetric for net  in-renters and  out-renters;  consistent  with the  view that
market power depends on relative scarcity of factors; in this environment of land scarcity, it is easier to
rent out than to rent in.
What, then, are the magnitudes of the productivity effects that are brought about by the operation of land
rental markets? A comparison can be  performed between sharecropped and owned (or cash-rented) plots
for the same household (in order to control for unobservable farmer attributes) allows to estimate the loss
due to the second-best nature of sharecropping.  Bell (1976) was the first to  conduct such an analysis,
finding that farmers  indeed exert less effort on tenanted plots. Applying the same methodology, Shaban
(1987) found that, on average, tenancy was associated with a 32 percent lower output; but the difference was
only 16 percent once adjustments were made for differences in land quality. Inputs of family labor and draft
animals were significantly lower on sharecropped plots than on owned parcels. No statistically significant
differences  in  productivity  were  found  between owned  plots and  plots  rented  on  a  fixed-rent  basis,
confirming that fixed-rent contracts induce higher productivity. Other studies yield results that point in the
same direction (Sen 1981).
The productivity  loss entailed  in sharecropping can be reduced through  close  social relationships,  as
confirmed by Sadoulet et al. (1997). Their study compared the attributes of contracts with kin and non-
kin, finding that  non-kin sharecroppers use significantly  less  inputs and obtain  less output.  However,
there  is neither a disincentive effect nor a reduction in output for sharecropping among close kin. This
suggests  that  embedding  contractual  arrangements  in  a  long-term  relationship  offers  considerable
potential  to  attenuate  the  disincentives  and  productivity  losses  that  are  otherwise  associated  with
sharecropping  contracts. This  evidence is  in line with the  comprehensive  review  of the  literature  by
Otsuka et al.  (1992) who found a  large number of studies about equally split between  efficiency  and
inefficiency of sharecropping contracts. Studies that did not find a disincentive effect of sharecropping
25were generally conducted in environments where such a contract was embedded in enduring family and
patron-client relationships or where effort was easily monitored.
Even within households, imperfections in land and labor markets, together with the inability to commit,
may prevent individuals from achieving an optimal allocation of productive factors. For plot level panel
data from Burkina Faso, Udry (1995) finds that reallocation of factors from male to  female controlled
plots within the same household could increase output by 6% - less than half of the estimated output loss
from  imperfect allocation  of productive  factors  at  the  village  level  (13%),  but still  significant.  One
interpretation is that, by "renting" out land to their husband, women would risk losing these rights. In the
absence of other assets that could be transferred from the husband to the wife to provide assurance, they
fail to do so, despite the productivity increases that this might entail.
All this implies that, although land rental markets can not completely eliminate structural impediments and
bring about a fully efficient allocation of land in an economy, they  can go  a long way in bringing the
operational distribution of holdings closer to the optimum. However, in quite a few countries, the extent of
land rental markets has been greatly diminished by large landowners reluctance to engage tenants due to
concern for potential challenges to their property rights. Furthermore, rental markets'  potential to increase
overall welfare was not well understood by governments. Consequently, the static productivity loss entailed
in sharecropping tended to induce interventions that have limited the extent of rental transactions, thus
causing a larger inefficiency in resource allocation. We turn now to discuss these and other policy issues
related to land markets.
4  POLICY ISSUES
This section draws the main policy conclusions from our earlier discussion, focusing on clarification and
adjudication of property rights,  ways to  improve the functioning of land  sales and rental  markets, and
redistributive land reform. These three steps form somewhat of a sequence, in the sense that it is difficult
to improve the functioning land sales or rental markets without clarification of land use and ownership
rights,  or to conduct non-expropriative  land reform in an environment where  land markets  are absent.
This implies that government activity should be focused on eliminating distortions and taking measures to
reduce market imperfections rather than attempting to compensate for  imperfections and distortions  in
other markets.
264.1  CLARIFICATION  AND ADJUDICATION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
A coherent system of property rights that guarantees security of tenure to cultivators, facilitates access to
land by the poor, and encourages investment to increase sustainability and productivity, is of overriding
policy importance in two types of settings. In countries making the transition from communal to  more
individualized forms of land ownership, there is need for a flexible, stepwise, and decentralized approach
that acknowledges differences in demand for tenure security based on diversity across regions and agro-
climatic conditions.  This implies the  need for a  legal framework that permits evolution  of land  rights
towards individualized tenure as the need emerges with commercialization and land scarcity. Second, in
situations where land tenure arrangements have been severely disrupted either by civil strife and war, by
collectivist land reform, or by land-grabbing of influential individuals (e.g. Bolivia, Honduras, Nicaragua,
Cuba,  Vietnam,  Ethiopia,  Uganda,  Tanzania,  and  the  FSU),  an  approach  that  adjudicates  among
overlapping claims and establishes clear ownership rights to land at minimum cost is needed.
The evidence reviewed in preceding sections demonstrates that secure land rights are crucial for longer-term
investment and  the  associated  productivity  increases. Land  registration and  titling  systems  are  often
perceived as an important element in a policy seeking to promote tenure security and to  facilitate more
effective land markets.  This is because official documentation provides better protection to an owner's
property rights, and eliminates the asymmetric information that curtails land markets transactions. However,
experience with titling programs has shown that in sparsely populated areas the cost of introducing formal
titling systems may outweigh the benefits and that the administrative infrastructure needed to effectively
implement such rights was not available. Similarly, formal documentation is not crucial where customary
tenure systems provide sufficient security to facilitate the level of investments and land transactions that are
relevant for the prevailing economic environment, and where credit markets are not yet developed to the
point where collateral use is necessary.
Past interventions have often underestimated the cost and administrative requirements of providing tenure
security through formal title and have given little thought to the scope for alternative means to provide
such  security.  Community-based  approaches  whereby  a  whole  area  is  demarcated  and  internal
administration  of land rights (including provision of documentation by  local authorities)  is left to the
community may  in many cases provide a cheaper alternative to formal titles (Platteau  1992). However,
the  critical  precondition  for  such  an  approach  to  work  is  that  consistent  implementation  of  this
arrangement  is  feasible,  that  decentralized  institutions  are  accountable  and  effective,  and  that  the
certificates awarded by such authorities are legally recognized, entailing a possibility of converting them
into more formal titles at a later stage.
27The 1992 modification of the Mexican Constitution, and similar arrangements in a number of other countries
(e.g. Bolivia, Colombia, Cote d'Ivoire, and Nicaragua), allow indigenous and non-indigenous communities
to administer property rights internally. In the case of Mexico this also  includes communities'  right to
decide, subject to established rules of accountability, on the partial or formal transformation of their land
rights into individual freehold title (Gordillo et al. 1997). In principle, such an arrangement would allow the
utilization of informational advantages available at  the community level to tailor property rights to the
specific situation at hand. However, little is known about the transaction costs incurred and the degree to
which  outcomes  have  been  equitable  and  conducive  to  improved  efficiency.  Evaluation  of  these
experiences within a consistent framework would be very desirable and could provide valuable insights to
fine-tune the approach and make the experience useful for other countries.
The benefits associated with individuals'  ability to  use title to gain access to formal credit  have  been
discussed  above.  Experience  shows  that  titling  programs  are  most  effective  in  areas  where  tenure
insecurity already affects incentives, where there  is an incipient formal credit market where title can be
used as a collateral because foreclosure of collateral is enforceable, and where an effective legal system
operates.40 It  is  important to  include  safeguards  against the  grabbing  of land  (and  in  particular  of
hitherto common land) by powerful and wealthy individuals, who are typically  better  informed on the
procedures entailed in more formal systems (Feder and Nishio, 1998).
Past experience  also  suggests that  land titling  should  be  systematic  and  area-based  rather  than  "on
demand".41 An  area-based  program  with  complete  coverage  can  utilize  economies  of  scale  in
measurement, adjudication, and a speedy process for conflict resolution. This would reduce the cost of
program  implementation.  Experience  in  Thailand,  El  Salvador,  Peru,  and  Bolivia,  among  others,
demonstrates that this can be accomplished by introducing titling  in combination with a mechanism for
dispute  resolution  on  location (within the community) and  a comprehensive  publicity campaign.4 2 In
contrast, "on demand titling" is not only costly, but is often very inequitable. It provides individuals with
good  political  connections-  opportunities  for  land  grabbing  and  precludes  poor  smallholders  from
participation due to the high cost of land registration.
"' The example of Kenya, where banks could not foreclose on the land that had been  given to them  as collateral because  of social and ethnic
factors illustrates that  -even where there is  a demand  for formal  credit and the use of land as collateral- itis  only  the ability to  effectively
foreclose on defaulters that will persuade banks to accept land as a collateral for loans (Ensminger  1997).
4'  Given the fixed cost element  entailed in "on demand" titling (which is based on individual initiative) and the lack of economies of scale, this
format of titling will tend to be more accessible to the wealthier landowner.
42  This  would  be of particular  importance  in  the  case of Africa where resistance  against titling  is fueled  more  by the  fact  that  generally
individualization  of land tenure has been associated with extreme land grabbing by powerful individuals - much more than the activation of a
land sales market that would disempower smallholders (Bruce, 1993).
284.2  IMPROVING  THE FUNCTIONING  OF LAND  SALES  AND  RENTAL  MARKETS
Land sales markets: The fear of the undesirable consequences associated with land market operation in
an environment characterized by market imperfections seem to have in the past motivated policy-makers
to impose restrictions on the operation of such markets. We have argued above that  in the presence of
multiple market imperfections and policy-induced distortions, reducing the transaction costs associated with
land sales or taking other measures (e.g. elimination of the threat of expropriation due to renting out) that
would improve the functioning of land markets will not necessarily enhance the efficiency of land allocation.
Administrative restrictions on land sales have, however, generally proven to be costly to enforce and were
often ineffective in preventing outcomes that were undesirable from an equity perspective.
Administrative restrictions on land sales typically take the two main forms of limits on tradability of land
and ownership ceilings. In many cases beneficiaries of land reform or settlers on state-owned land are not
allowed to  sell or mortgage their land.  This would deprive them  from accessing credit - often  in the
establishment phase when credit would be most needed. It has been shown that, in the presence of such
restrictions, small-holders are forced to resort to less efficient arrangements (e.g. usufruct-mortgaging and
the associated use of wage labor contracts) to gain access to credit (Hayami and Otsuka 1993). The desirable
goal of preventing land reform beneficiaries from selling out in response to temporary shocks would be
better served by adequate training and preparation, as well as ensuring that they have access to the resources
and know-how  necessary to  establish productive investments, and in  complementary reforms of credit
markets and institutions (e.g., liberalizing interest rates). Permanently precluding land reform beneficiaries
from rental or sales is likely to reduce efficiency -by  permitting the existence of large tracts of uncultivated
or less than optimally utilized land reform land; allowing for some adjustments in response to differential
settler ability may be preferable to the losses imposed by this measure.
Another restriction intended to facilitate the breakup of large farms and the associated sales of land to small
producers has been the imposition of land ownership ceilings, often together with land taxes. Although little
rigorous evidence concerning the impact of such ceiling laws exists, they appear to have imposed extra cost
on  landowners who often took measures to avoid them and on the bureaucracy which had to decide on
exceptions to allow for the utilization of economies of scale in plantation crops - a process conducive to red
tape and corruption. Even in the most favorable case such ceilings would constitute a temporary second best
measure to allow government to deal with the problem in a more thorough way. If, as suggested by the
evidence, the  reason  for  land concentration  is not in a  relative  inefficiency of  small farns  but rather
imperfections and policy-induced distortions in product and financial markets and the limitations on small
farmers' ability to self-insure, it would be more effective for government to focus on the root of the problem
29rather than trying to deal with the symptoms. This  implies that concerns about potential adverse equity
impacts of land sales should be addressed by helping small farmers to compete, taking measures to improve
the functioning of financial markets, and providing relief to avoid distress sales in cases of disaster.
Land  taxation: A moderate land tax levied and collected by local Governments can make an important
contribution to effective decentralization.  The theoretical attractiveness of a  land tax  derives from two
reasons. On the one hand, taxation of land is one of the few cases of a lump sum tax where -using  asset
rather than production values- the effective tax rate on income decreases with the income generated from
the land, thus encouraging more productive resource use. On the other hand, a land tax is one of the few
taxes that can provide revenues for the local governments, and that -through  the capitalization of local
amenities in land values- establishes a direct relationship between tax level and the benefits received by
taxpayers (Glaeser 1995).
Several countries have attempted to implement progressive land taxes, where the tax rate would increase
with land area or value, as a means to make land speculation less attractive and to induce large landowners
to use their land more intensively or to break up large estates. Experience with this instrument has not been
very positive as implementation and collection of progressive land taxes have been frustrated by political
difficulties and resistance in countries as diverse as Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Colombia, and Jamaica
(Strasma et al. 1987; Bird 1974). Carter and Mesbah (1996) use simulations to show that a progressive land
tax by itself is unlikely to be effective even if it is enforceable. Effectively collecting a uniform land tax may
be a more realistic goal.  However, in environments characterized by high risk, introduction of a land tax
may not be desirable for equity reasons and a mix of land tax (which will have to be paid regardless of
realized output) and output tax (contingent on realized output) Pareto-dominates either tax in isolation (Hoff
1991). To avoid negative equity consequences that might be associated with a  land tax, a  number  of
developing countries exempt small producers below a certain size from the need to pay land taxes.
Land  rental markets: Their  potential shortcomings notwithstanding, rental  markets  are more  effective
than  sales  markets  in  moving  the  distribution  of  operational  holdings  closer  to  the  optimum.  The
analytical  literature suggests that both the efficiency  and the equity impact  of the  land rental  markets
depend on tenants'  bargaining power, i.e. their reservation utility. Mere prohibition of certain contractual
forms that does not change the underlying forces  and may  lead to a worsened resource  allocation by
forcing market participants to resort even less efficient arrangements.
Rather than recognizing the potential of land rental markets to improve agricultural productivity and to
augment the welfare of landless poor people, governments have often focused efforts on restricting tenancy
30markets through advised bans on share tenancy and limits on cash rental fees.  From a theoretical point of
view, the expected impact would be ambiguous. On the one hand, there  is a negative direct  effect  as
prohibition of tenant eviction precludes the landlord from using the threat of eviction as a device to elicit
higher effort by the tenant and would therefore be expected to reduce productivity. On the other hand, the
reallocation of bargaining power in favor of the tenant would increase incentives to supply effort and thus
productivity. While one would expect the adverse incentive effect to dominate at low wealth levels, the
positive effect would be dominant for farmers with intermediate wealth(Banerjeeand Ghatak, 1997).
Empirically,  district  level data  from  West  Bengal  suggest  that  effective  implementation  of  tenancy
registration  which  protected  tenants  from  being  evicted  and  fixed  an  upper  ceiling  for  rent  yielded
significant productivity gains of about 40% - larger than the static loss estimated by Shaban (Banerjee and
Ghatak, 1997). While this  suggests that tenancy reforms can be effective, one should not forget that the
study area is thie  only state in India where regulation of tenancy was actually implemented, that costs of
implementation need to be considered in making  an assessment of the  economic benefits from such a
measure, and that tenancy reform may not have been the only alternative available.
Regulatory interventions such as tenancy regulation lead to reduced investment incentives on the part of
the  landlord, while tenants  may not perceive sufficient security to invest at what would  be a socially
optimal  level. The trade-off between the positive effect of greater security to tenants and the investment
incentives  of owners  is not easily  balanced.  Therefore, scarce  financial and  administrative  resources
might be better  spent in efforts to foster  general pro-poor development (e.g. education,  infrastructure,
credit  and  insurance,  markets,  and  off-farm  employment  opportunities)  that  improve  the  bargaining
position  of would-be  tenants,  and  that  facilitate  more fixed  rent contracts,  than  in trying  to  enforce
tenancy regulations. The difficulty of striking such a balance is illustrated by the fact that, in areas where
tenancy was prohibited,  wage  labor (which  is less conducive to  productivity than  tenancy  or owner-
operated  farming due to lower effort by workers) is common, leading to  inefficient factor  substitution
away from labor (Otsuka et al. 1993).
4.3  REDISTRIBUTIVE  LAND REFORM
Our earlier discussion pointed out that unmitigated operation of land markets alone would not necessarily
produce an optimal land allocation.  In the land sales market, credit constraints would restrict the ability
of the poor to acquire  land (or any other  indivisible asset), a phenomenon that has, in a more  general
context,  been  shown  to  be  associated  with  intergenerational  persistence  of  poverty  (Banerjee  and
31Newman  1991).43 Transactions in the land rental market are easier to accomplish, but may be associated
with  a  more  limited  impact  on  investment  and  productivity  as  well  as  tenant  welfare.  Efficiency-
enhancing rental transactions might not come about either because of high transaction costs (especially in
an unclear legal environment) or because of government restrictions that threaten rented properties with
expropriation. In situations characterized by pervasive inequality in the ownership distribution of land or
assets  more  generally,  government  involvement  in  redistributive  land  reform,  aiming  to  improve
efficiency  and equity and at  the same time  remove impediments to the functioning  of factor markets,
could be justified.
However, historically the experience with government initiated land reform policies has been mixed, not
only because reforms involving significant asset transfers are politically difficult and could be speedily
implemented only where they were imposed by an outside power or a revolutionary change of regime.4 4
In the case of landlord estates where tenants already cultivated the land and all that was required was a
reassignment of property rights, land reform was generally easy: The organization of production retained
the same family farm  system, where beneficiaries already had the  skills and implements  necessary to
cultivate  their  fields. The  administrative  requirements associated  with this  type  of  land  reform  were
minimal and considerable efficiency gains have often been realized, by improving incentives to work and
invest by former tenants. 45  The magnitude of such gains was affected by the difference in (long- and
short-term) incentives between the before- and after-reform situation. Where before the reform security
of tenure and incentives to invest had already been high, cash-rent (rather than share rent) contracts had
prevailed, and landlords had provided tenants with access to markets for credit, inputs, and outputs, one
would expect the productivity gains from such reforms to be more modest.4 6
By contrast to the generally  successful experience in landlord estates, land reform  in hacienda systems
i.e. systems where tenants had a small house-plot for subsistence but worked for most of their time on the
landlord's home farm, has been very difficult to accomplish. Thus some argued that the "game of Latin
American Land Reform" has been lost (de Janvry and Sadoulet,  1989). In the large  majority of these
"  This  idea  has been  formalized  in  theoretical  models where  lack  of collateral  keeps  individuals  in  "poverty  traps",  unable  to  undertake
indivisible  investments  which  would  be  highly  profitable  (Galor  andZeira  1993, Eckstein  and Zilcha  1994; Jalan  and  Ravallion,  1996,
Fafchamps and Pender  1996).1  n such a situation, a one-off asset distribution could be more effective than continuing redistributive efforts with
the associated disincentive effects (Banerjee and Newman 1993).
44  The marked difference in the success of land reform between Korea, Taiwan, and Japan on the one side and Nicaragua, Cuba and Vietnam on
the other suggests that the ability to redistribute large amounts of land is not a sufficient condition for land reform to be successful.
45  Indeed, since the end of World War 11,  landlord estates in Bolivia, Eastem India, Ethiopia, Iran, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan have been transferred to
tenants in the course of successful land reforms. While evidence on the productivity impact  of such reforms is much less than what would be desirable,
they have generally been associated with significant increases in output and/or productivity (King 19731jieten  1996, Besley and Burgess 1998).
46  The degree to which land reform improved productivity and cultivator welfare increased with the profitability of existing investment opportunities
(Callison 1983; Koo 1968; King 1973); the degree to which land ownership enabled the new owners' to access markets for credit and insurance that
had previously been beyond their reach pomer  and Thiesenhusen 1990),  and the availability of new technology that could be readily adopted (Otsuka
1991).
32systems, large  landowners responded to the threat of land reform  by either evicting tenants who could
have made  claims to  land ownership under a  possible reform program,  or converting  them  into wage
laborers.  In  the  case  of  eviction,  landlords  reduced  reliance  on  hired  workers  either  by  resuming
extensive livestock production and ranching or -aided by significant credit subsidies-  by embarking on
highly mechanized self-cultivation (Binswanger et al. 1995). This did not only reduce tenant welfare but
also depopulated farms and created further difficulties for redistributive land reform. A number of further
difficulties of effective land reform in hacienda systems are associated with policy distortions, limitations
on the functioning of the land market, and inability to provide the necessary complementary elements for
land reform beneficiaries to start successful small farm enterprises.
First, the cost of carrying out land reform were often increased by the continued existence of implicit and
explicit  policy distortions (e.g. agricultural  protection and selective credit  subsidies)  which  drove land
prices above the  capitalized  value  of agricultural  profits and  often  disproportionately  benefited  large
producers.  Such  distortions  increased  the  fiscal  cost  of  land  reform  policies  and  reduced  their
sustainability by making it profitable for land reform beneficiaries to sell their newly acquired land back
to  large  farmers.  Indeed,  despite attempts to  limit  beneficiary  desertion through  imposition of  legal
restrictions  and  the  threat  of  punishment  in  case  of  contravention, there  is  considerable  anecdotal
evidence on  land sales by  reform  beneficiaries in Nicaragua,  Colombia, and  El Salvador.  In a  recent
Census  of  Brazilian  land  reformn settlements,  only  about  60%  of  recently  established  land  reform
beneficiaries were actually found tilling their land (El Globo 1997).
Secondly, many countries aimed to  implement land reform by eliminating or restricting other forms of
(rental and sales) market transactions. This completely eliminated price and other market signals, making it
more difficult to select beneficiaries and land and further increased  the costs of land reform implementation.
It also tilted the balance in favor of a highly centralized mode of land reform implementation that has, in a
number of countries, led to the domination of land reform processes by formidable (and often corrupt)
centralized bureaucracies. In addition, and probably most important, this virtually eliminated beneficiaries'
access to credit markets, despite the evidence that without access to such markets, it will be difficult for them
to sustain themselves. In some cases, beneficiaries became worse off than they had been before, if a landlord
provided them with inputs and possibly even credit for consumption smoothing. In Ireland, for example, a
large scale experiment in "negotiated"  land reform  early in the 2 0th century did not have the expected
effect for two reasons. On the one hand it did little to alter the structure of production or to  improve
tenants' rights. More importantly, however, it actually worsenedaccess to credit, by limiting the ability of
33new  landowners to mortgage  land while  at the same time cutting  off informal  credit  they  had earlier
obtained from the landlord (Guinnaune and Miller, 1997).7
Thirdly, transforming a large farm into a viable smaliholder enterprise requires a change in the pattern of
production, subdivision of the farm, and construction of infrastructure.  As the productivity advantage of land
reform hinges on increased incentives by owner-operators and adoption of labor-intensive crops, attention to
complementary investments and awareness by beneficiaries are critical. Generally beneficiaries, even if they
are workers of the former  farm, are  not accustomed to  making  independent entrepreneurial decisions,
implying that training and human capital formation is therefore an essential component of the land reform
process. Realizing the productivity benefits from land reform requires to shift the focus from political to
productivity- and poverty related objectives48
Due to these difficulties, and the fact that land reform was a highly politicized topic,  many of the land
reforms that have been undertaken since the 1960s have not achieved their stated objectives. Evidence on
the  longer-term  impact  of land  reform  on poverty  and  productivity  is more  limited  than  desirable. 49
However, in countries (e.g. Zimbabwe,  Malawi, South Africa,  Brazil, Colombia, and  the Philippines,
among others) that  continue to  be characterized by concentration  underutilized  tracts  of land  in large
farms alongside with pervasive lack of land access for poor and landless, macro-economic reforms have
altered the  rules of the  game. The fall  in  land prices  associated with  the  loss of privileges  that  had
historically  been  conferred on  large farms  them  by  discriminatory  laws, trade  protection,  and  credit
subsidies might make it easier to utilize the market for a type of land redistribution aimed at increasing
productivity and equity.
To this end, a number of countries (Brazil, Colombia, South Africa) are in the process of implementing a
new model of "negotiated" land reform. Key elements of this approach are (i) an emphasis on sustainable
poverty reduction through elaboration of integrated farm projects by the poor (which are then supported by a
land purchase grant); (ii) decentralized execution and integration into development objectives at the local
level with an overarching emphasis on beneficiary training and human capital formation; (iii) and private
sector involvement in project development, financing, and implementation. Obviously, mere adoption of a
"negotiated"  mode  is  not  immune  against the  shortcomings that  have  plagued  earlier  land  reform
4  Severely restricted access to credit, together with insecure property rights have also led to widespread selling of land by  former land reform
beneficiaries in Nicaragua - often at prices way below the productive value of the land (Joakin 1996).
"K The effect of political motivation on  beneficiary selection and the stop-and go cycle of land reform in response to political crises rather than
opportunities for productivity  increases and poverty reduction, and the difficulties of urban-basecdlites to design  reform programs to suit small
farmers are well documented (Barraclough  1970).Apolitical approach to land reformwould be consistent with the interpretation of land reform as a
piecemeal strategy by the rich to avoid the imminent  threat of revolt - with backtracking as soon as the threat weakensl [orowitz 1993).
"' One example for such economic analysis is the study by Scott et al (1976) for Kenya. While it illustrates that land reform can have a positive
social rate of retum, it is based on data gathered in the immediate aftermath of the reforms after which data collection was discontinued.
34attempts.50 Initial evidence from pilots that have aimed to integrate land reform into a more comprehensive
package of support does, however, suggests that the new approach is perceived to be significantly different
from earlier land reform attempts (Deininger, 1998). While this points towards a scope to reduce poverty
and increases agricultural productivity and a positive social rate of return, the degree to which this potential
is actually realized needs to be assessed through careful monitoring in the future.
5. CONCLUSION:  AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
While research  on land markets  and land institutions  has been extensive, there  are a number of areas
where additional or more conclusive knowledge would be of great value. Below we highlight a number of
key areas that would merit further study.
SECURITY OF LAND RIGHTS
There is broad agreement in the  literature that secure individual land rights will increase  incentives to
undertake  productivity  enhancing  land-related  investments.  If  there  is  scope  for  agricultural
intensification,  these  rights  can  be  enforced  at  low  cost,  and  secondary  rights  to  land  by  other
stakeholders are not eliminated in the process, then establishment of such rights would constitute a clear
Pareto improvement. However, in many cases,  traditional systems are associated with a wide range of
equity benefits  not all of which  can normally  be preserved in a  system characterized  by  private land
ownership. Research aiming to understand not only the existence and magnitude of productivity benefits
arising from the transition from traditional to private property rights, but also the types of welfare benefits
provided  by  different  forms  of  communal  arrangements,  their  magnitude,  and  possible  alternative
mechanisms to generate similar effects, would be very useful. It could facilitate better identification of the
point  at  which  a  transition  from traditional  to  individualized tenure  arrangements  might  be  socially
optimal  and  allow  adoption  of  mechanisms  that  would  ensure  tenure  security  with  minimal  social
disruption. Evaluation of country cases where innovative ways to make this transition have been explored
recently could be a starting point for such an endeavor.
LAND MARKETS
While  there  has  been significant  research on  the  static inefficiency of tenancy  contracts, the  welfare
consequences and the  impact of tenancy on farmers'  investment behavior have  received less attention.
"'  Due to  a lack  of poverty targeting, an exclusive  focus  on land purchases  but not complementary  investments,  and a high (75%/6)  level of
subsidy, a "negotiated" programn  of land reforn  that was carried out in Italy during the 1948 to  1970 period had only  a limited impact on poverty
reduction and was characterized by relatively high costs (Shearer and Barbero 1993).
35Assessment of the welfare  aspects of tenancy,  i.e. the  impact of land ownership as compared to mere
usufructuary  rights on  household well-being  would be of relevance to  help  policy-makers  determine
specific steps for comprehensive land market development. Such analysis should consider the impact of
access to  land  under  different  systems on productivity  and welfare  (e.g. through choice  of livelihood
strategies, higher or more smooth consumption, access to credit, ability to accumulate wealth, etc.).
A  large body  of literature  on land  price formation, and the relationship  between land  sales and  rental
prices exists in developed countries (see Just and Miranowski in this volume). However, much less is
known  on  this  issue  in developing  countries,  in particular  how  recent  dramatic  changes  in  macro-
economic  policy have  affected  land values  and the  relationship  between  land  prices and  agricultural
profits. Elimination of credit subsidies and tax privileges, changes in relative prices of different types of
agricultural products, and increased attractiveness of non-land financial assets that have been associated
with these policies would have important implications not only for land prices but also for the operation
of land (sales and rental) markets. This would also affect the type of economic agents who would be able
to use these markets to gain access to land and the type of complementary policies (e.g. in the area of
credit) that would affect their ability to do so.
Notwithstanding the fact that markets are an important avenue for individuals to gain access to land, non-
market transactions such as inheritance, allocation by village chiefs, informal rentals among kin, and use
of on common property resources for collection and gathering continue to have a far-reaching impact on
a large part of the population and the structure of land ownership and land use in many parts of the world.
A  large  descriptive  literature  discusses  advantages  and  disadvantages  of  non-market  mechanisms.
However, quantitative  evidence on the efficiency and equity impact of non-market transactions and the
way in which policies that aim to change decision-makers'  incentive affect the extent and modalities of
such  transactions  is  still  limited.  Given  that  informal  systems  tend  to  be  characterized  by  lower
transaction costs and can provide land access for the poorest segments of the population who may not be
able to utilize land rental and sales markets, better understanding of the potentials and  shortcomings of
non-market mechanisms  would be of great interest. There is also  little doubt that  in situations where,
either traditionally or due to male out-migration, a significant part of agricultural production activities is
carried out by women, the nature of womens'  land rights -many  of which are defined  informally- will
have far-reaching  implications for agricultural productivity and investment. However, much remains to
be learned about the interaction between legal prescriptions, social norms, and intra-household bargaining
in determining the nature of womens'  rights to  land, and the scope for  specific policy interventions to
bring about efficiency increases by strengthening these rights.
36Over and above the market imperfections characteristic of rural areas, functioning of land rental and sales
markets has, in the past, often been constrained by government interventions - in many cases with the
aim to promote equity or overcome market imperfections. While the effectiveness of such policies was
often limited, they generally left an institutional legacy that is difficult to dismantle. Research on the links
between  land  and other markets  could do  much to  identify such "second  generation reforms"  and to
facilitate their implementation in an environment characterized by multiple market imperfections.
LAND  REDISTRIBUTION
Compared to the volume of resources that has, since the 1960s, been spent on land reform programs, the
effort invested to monitor their performance and assess their impact on poverty reduction and agricultural
productivity  was  minuscule.  As  a  consequence,  evidence  on  promising  models  of  land  reform  in
haciendas and the  long-term  impact associated with them  is extremely  limited. Little  or  no guidance
exists to compare the effectiveness of different approaches to land reform in (i) reaching  specific target
groups; (ii) in helping these groups to complement land ownership with other  investments and thereby
increase agricultural productivity; and (iii) enabling them to convert the one-time transfer of land into a
sustained  improvement in their livelihood. Such evidence will be critical to  assess whether these  new
approaches to market assisted land reform are fiscally, socially, and economically sustainable.
Given  the recent emphasis  in the theoretical  literature on  asset ownership as a  means for  sustainable
poverty reduction, it would be of great interest to carefully monitor innovative land reform efforts with a
view toward drawing  the necessary policy-conclusions.  Issues to be explored include the volume  and
price of land (sales and rental) transactions, characteristics of participants, and the productivity  change
associated with land transactions within and outside a specific land reform program. Complementing this
with longitudinal information on changes in welfare of specific beneficiaries and the population at large
would provide an opportunity to assess the equity impact of land reform and ultimately compare this type
of intervention to other policies aimed at the same goal.
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